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Chapter 10
Early Pension Plans for
State and Local Workers

The federal government lagged behind the states, which in turned lagged
behind a number of cities, in establishing pension plans for its workers.
Decades before the states or the federal government provided civilian workers with a pension plan, several large American cities established plans
for at least some of their employees. Until the Wrst decades of the twentieth
century, however, these plans were generally limited to three groups of
employees: police ofWcers, WreWghters, and teachers. New York City established the Wrst such plan for its police ofWcers in 1857. Like the early military plans, the New York City police pension plan was a disability plan until
a retirement feature was added in 1878 (Mitchell et al. 2001). Only a few
other (primarily large) cities joined New York with a plan before 1900. In
contrast, municipal workers in Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, Germany,
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom were covered by
retirement plans by 1910 (Squier 1912).
Despite the late start, the subsequent growth of such plans in the United
States was rapid. By 1916, 159 cities had a plan for one or more of these
groups of workers, and 21 of those cities included other municipal employees in some type of pension coverage (Monthly Labor Review 1916). Strictly
speaking, many of these early plans were disability plans rather than retirement plans. Thus, the development of retirement pension plans for civilian
public employees was similar to that found in the history of the original
navy and army pension plans. Furthermore, many of these early pension
plans were funded entirely by workers’ contributions, making them more
like forced savings plans rather than retirement plans in the contemporary
sense of that term. Still, like those early military plans, either the city plans
evolved into retirement plans or retirement plans were created de novo. So
by the early twentieth century, pension plans were fairly common for big
city workers.
The establishment of these early municipal plans hinged on an important aspect of public Wnance in the United States. SpeciWcally, the political
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relationship between the cities and the states was such that the exact conditions under which a city could create a pension plan for its workers was
not always explicitly spelled out. The Constitution determines the manner in which U.S. territories become states. With the notable exception of
the original thirteen states, much of the land in the rest of the contiguous
states was originally “public land.” As such, it was surveyed, organized into
sections and townships or other small political units, and then auctioned by
the Land OfWce or one of its manifestations under one or more of the
numerous land ordinances passed after the Treaty of Paris of 1783. In short,
the federal government created the states, and within the states, federal
law was responsible for creating townships; however, the states typically
found it useful or administratively more efWcient to aggregate townships
into larger political units typically called counties. In addition, within many
counties there were areas of sufWcient population density and/or commercial activity that they became cities. While there was no doubt that the states
had the power to create cities, the boundary of the states’ powers over their
creations was an issue of great political dispute during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Not surprisingly, the history of local pension
plans became entwined with this dispute since this was exactly the period
that saw an expansion of local pension plans.
From the end of the American Revolution, municipal corporate charters
were granted by the state legislatures, generally on a case-by-case basis.
Each corporate charter speciWed what types of public services could or
would be offered, what types of taxes could be levied, and what types of liabilities could be incurred by these “minor” political units. This process lent
itself to certain political abuses. SpeciWcally, the state political machines
could include clauses in the charter or subsequently pass special acts that
promoted their objectives regardless of the welfare of the municipalities’
citizens. The clauses or acts included just about any conceivable aspect
of city administration, including, among other items, taxation, public
works projects, and police administration. The typical objective of these
actions was simply the control of political patronage or the public purse
through employment and/or public contracts. Among the liabilities that
were typically constrained by state control or corporate charter, either
explicitly or implicitly, was compensation of public employees, including
pension plans. Thus, many local municipalities could not unilaterally create a pension plan for public employees because the cities were either constrained in their ability to create an unfunded liability or constrained in
their ability to create and maintain a fund to pay pension liabilities, or both.
Obviously, there was an incentive on the part of local politicians and citizens to wrest control of this process from the state legislature. Beginning
with the state of Ohio in 1851, a number of states ratiWed or amended their
state constitutions to prohibit such actions on the part of the legislature.1
By the early twentieth century, nearly three-fourths of the states had such a
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constitutional provision. These constitutional remedies typically took the
form of clauses that required the legislature to provide for the organization
of smaller political units by the creation of “general laws” rather than
speciWc charters. However, there were two problems with the constitutional
approach to limiting state involvement in municipal affairs. First, the constitutions typically only indicated what states could do. They did not explicitly
say what cities could do or what states could not do. Second, state legislatures quickly learned how to circumvent the spirit of their state constitutions by creating “classes” of cities and then deWning the classes in such a
way that only one city might be in a class. Thus, by passing a “general” law
for all cities of a certain “class” (usually deWned by population), the state
legislature could in fact pass a speciWc law for the city with that population.
So, for example, Pennsylvania had one “Wrst class” city, one “second-class”
city, and one “2a class” city.
It was such problems that led to the so-called “home-rule” movement of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Home-rule in this context
meant explicit constitutional or legislative recognition of municipal control
over speciWc aspects of local public Wnance. As with legislation aimed at settling other multifaceted disputes, it was difWcult to employ language that
would apply to all or even most of the possible issues that might be disputed.
Some examples include those that grant local control over “municipal
affairs,” “local and municipal matters,” and local “property, government
and affairs.” Exactly what constituted municipal “affairs” or “matters” was
left to the courts to decide. In practice, the states typically maintained the
right to regulate education, courts, and utilities. The cities obtained the
right to control municipal employees, including police and WreWghting
personnel, zoning, and so forth. However, the disputes that persisted during the period in question included municipal Wnance, taxation, and debt.
These and other aspects of municipal administration were clearly linked to
municipal pension plans. Eventually, some states passed enabling legislation that either created pension funds or explicitly permitted cities do so.
The pernicious effects of the absence of home rule were felt most acutely
in the southern states. After Reconstruction the Democratic machines that
took control of the state legislatures attempted to maintain that control by
denying home rule to the county and municipal governments. The experience of North Carolina offers an example of the practice. Almost immediately after the end of Republican rule, the state legislature passed an act in
which the legislature possessed the power to appoint all local justices of the
peace, who in turn elected the county commissioners. Thus control of the
counties was vested in the legislature through the patronage appointments
of justices of the peace (Woodward 1951). In this system, the state had no
interest in seeing the local governments establish pensions. In general this
system proved more stubborn and damaging in the south than elsewhere,
and, as our discussion and evidence below suggests, this fact manifest itself
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in the almost complete absence of pension plans at the state and local level
until well into the twentieth century.

Early Municipal Pension Plans
At least partly as a result of the constitutional changes of the late nineteenth
century and the home-rule movement, by the early decades of the twentieth
century almost every city of any size in America had some type of pension
plan for its police ofWcers and WreWghters, and many cities, as well as some
states, had created plans for teachers. In 1917, 85 percent of cities with
100,000 or more residents paid some form of police pension, as did 66 percent of those with populations between 50,000 and 100,000, and 50 percent
of cities with population between 30,000 and 50,000 had some pension liability (James 1921). These data were compiled from municipal accounts.
So, it is important to note that these Wgures do not mean that all of these
cities had a formal pension plan. They only indicate that a city had at least
$1.00 of pension liability among its accounts. This liability could have been
from a disability pension, a forced savings plan, or a discretionary pension.
Still, by 1928, the Monthly Labor Review (April 1928) could characterize
police and Wre plans as “practically universal.” At that time, all cities with
populations of over 400,000 had a pension plan for either police ofWcers or
WreWghters or both. Only one, St. Louis, did not have a plan for police
ofWcers. Several of those cities had plans for their other municipal employees and some cities maintained pension plans for city schoolteachers separately from state teachers’ plans, which are reviewed in the next section.2
In this section, these plans will be discussed in four groups—those for
police ofWcers, WreWghters, other municipal employees, and teachers. Seven
characteristics of these plans are examined for each group, including the number of workers covered, the nature of the employee’s contribution, the nature
of the employer’s contribution, how the administration costs of the plan
were paid, the qualiWcations for a pension, the manner in which the pension beneWt was calculated, and a summary of any dependents’ beneWts.
Table 10.1 contains a summary of early police pensions. New York, the
nation’s largest city, established the Wrst police pension plan in 1857. As
Table 10.1 shows, the New York plan remained the largest in the country by
far, though because of differences in the types of personnel covered by the
various plans, the Wgures in the second column are not strictly comparable
across cities. A few other plans dated in one form or another from the late
nineteenth century. Chicago, Detroit, Indianapolis, and St. Louis all had
plans in place before 1900—though the St. Louis plan was inoperative for
a period after its creation.
The plans certainly differed across cities, but they also share some general characteristics. For example, when reviewing the contributions and
level of beneWts, it is worth keeping in mind that the typical patrolman in a

Police ofWcers N.A.
were covered
with other
municipal
employees; see
Table 10.3
1,144

6,080

Baltimore

Boston

Buffalo

Chicago

3.5% of annual
salary up to
$2,600

1–3% of
annual salary

Municipality
paid 100%

Municipal
0.125% of
police
annual salary
retirement tax up to $2,600

100% of the
difference
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

N.A.

Municipality
paid 100%

Administration
costs

Retirement after
20 years of service and 50 years
of age; but no
service
requirement
beyond age 57

20 years of
service with no
age requirements

N.A.

No age or years
of service
requirements

Conditions

Annuity of twice
the ofWcer’s
accumulation
up to 75% of
annual salary
up to $2,600

One-half of
annual salary
at the time of
retirement

N.A.

One-half
of annual
salary at the
time of
retirement

BeneWt

Widow’s
beneWts up to
60% of
ofWcer’s salary,
and $10–25 for
each child
under age 18

$300–1,200
or one-half
ofWcer’s salary

N.A.

If ofWcer died
while on duty,
then widow
receives a
pension at the
commissioner’s
discretion

Dependent
beneWts

9:35 AM

N.A.

100% of the
difference
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

Employer
contributions

2/27/03

1-3% of
annual salary

1,864

City

Employee
contributions

Police
personnel
covered

Table 10.1. Municipal Police Pension Plans in the United States, c. 1920s
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1,421

2,762

Plan includes 4% of annual
police ofWcers salary
and Wremen;
no Wgures on
participation
are availible

Cleveland

Detroit

Los Angeles

1% of annual
salary

100% of the
difference
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

Municipality
paid 100%

Municipal
Municipality
police
paid 100%
retirement tax

Municipal
Municipality
police
paid 100%
retirement tax

35 years of
service, with
no age
requirements,
for full beneWts;
after 25 years
of service

25 years of service with no age
requirements

25 years of service with no age
requirements

25 years of service with no age
requirements

Conditions

$300–1,200 or
one-half
ofWcer’s salary

Dependent
beneWts

66% of average
annual salary
during the last
three years of
service (50% for
25 years of
service)

One-half of
annual salary
at the time of
retirement

Widow receives
50% of the
employees’
average annual
salary during
the last three
years of service

Widow receives
$100 a month
and $20 per
month for each
child under
age 16

$87.66 to $125 $300–1,200 or
per month
one-half
depending on
ofWcer’s salary
rank at retirement

One-half of
annual salary
at the time of
retirement

BeneWt

9:35 AM

$1 per month

Administration
costs

Municipal
Municipality
police
paid 100%
retirement tax

Employer
contributions

2/27/03

$1 per month

525

Cincinnati

Employee
contributions

City

172

Police
personnel
covered

Table 10.1. Continued
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1% of
annual salary

2% of annual
salary for those
entering service
before age 35;
4% otherwise

Minneapolis 499

Newark

1–3% of
annual salary

New York

15,950

1–3% of
annual salary

100% of the
difference
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

Municipality
paid 100%

2% of annual Municipality
police
paid 100%
department
appropriations

Retirement after
25 years of service; 20 years at
age 55; mandatory at age 60

20 years of service with no age
requirements

4% of annual Police and Fire 20 years of servdepartmental Departments ice with no age
appropriations paid 100%
requirements
for salaries

One-half of
annual salary
at the time of
retirement

One-half of
annual salary
at the time of
retirement

One-half of
annual salary
at the time of
retirement

One-half of
annual salary
at the time
retirement

Annuity equal
to twice the
ofWcer’s
accumulated
contributions up
to 75% of
highest annual
salary

Lump-sum
payment equal
to annual salary,
plus either the
larger of $600
or one-half
annual salary

Widow receives
$150 annually

Widow receives
$1000 annually;
orphans under
the under the
age of 16
receive $25
per month

$300–$1,200 or
one-half
officer’s salary

Widow’s
beneWts up to
75% of ofWcer’s
salary, and
$10–15 per
month per
child under
age 18

9:35 AM

New Orleans 877

Retirement after
20 years of service
and 50 years of
age, or 15 years
of service and 57
years of age

Municipal
$2.00 annually Retirement
police
after 20 years of
retirement tax
service and 50
years of age

Municipal
0.125% of
police
annual salary
retirement tax

2/27/03

Plan includes
police ofWcers
and Wremen;
no Wgures on
participation
are available

3% of annual
salary

938

Milwaukee
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N.A.

St. Louis

Plan includes 2.5% of
police ofWcers annual salary
and Wremen;
no Wgures on
participation
are availible

$1 per month

Sources: Monthly Labor Review, various issues.

Washington

San Francisco 1,186

1%-3% of
annual salary

904

Pittsburgh

100% of the
difference
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

Funds raised
from various
Wnes and
municipal
licenses

N.A.

2% of
municipal
tax revenues

100% of the
difference
between
employee
contributions

Municipality
paid 100%

Municipality
paid 100%

N.A.

Municipality
paid 100%

Municipality
paid 100%

Administration
costs

One-half of
average annual
salary during
the last three
years of service

N.A.

$50 to $75
per month
depending on
on rank at
retirement

One-half of
average annual
salary during
the last ten years
of service

BeneWt

No service of age One-half of
requirements
at the time of
of retirement

20 years of service with no age
requirements;
retirement
mandatory at
age 65

N.A.

20 years of service with no age
requirements

Retirement after
20 years of service and 50 years
of age

Conditions

Widow receives
$60 a month at
and $10 per
month for each
child under
age 16

Widow or other
dependent(s)
receives one-half
the officer’s
salary

N.A.

$1,200
lump-sum
payment

Widow receives
$20 a month
and $6 per
month for each
child under
age 14

Dependent
beneWts

9:35 AM

N.A.

1 day’s pay up
to $3,000 in
annual salary

Employer
contributions

2/27/03

Philadelphia 5,600

Employee
contributions

174

City

Police
personnel
covered

Table 10.1. Continued
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big city police department would have earned between $1,500 and $2,000
annually in the late 1920s. So the 4 percent employee’s contribution in Los
Angeles or 3.5 percent in Chicago would have been large relative to the
$1.00 a month an employee contributed in Cincinnati, Cleveland, or San
Francisco. Still, every city with a police pension plan required some contribution from the employees. With respect to the city’s contribution, there
were basically two types of plans: those that had some type of revenue
stream, however uncertain, which was dedicated to the pension fund, typically a share of the city property tax or Wnes, and those that had no such
funds. Although one might use the term “funded” in this context to mean
that a speciWc public revenue stream was dedicated to pay for the city’s pension liabilities, this is not to be confused with a fully funded plan in which
the city contributed an amount that was consistent with the actuarially
determined liabilities of the pension plan. None of the plans in Table 10.1
meet that standard. The two largest plans provide an example of the contrast. Chicago’s plan was funded by an assessment on the city’s property tax,
whereas New York simply paid, through annual municipal revenues, the difference between current liabilities and the current contributions of employees. Neither of these methods ensured the long-run viability of these
plans, at least not in any actuarial sense.
Curiously, and perhaps as a consequence of the lack of sound funding,
many of these cities turned to other sources of revenues to fund their police
pensions. These included but were not limited to the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Wnes imposed on police ofWcers for disciplinary purposes,
rewards or donations bestowed for special services or valor,
fees for street permits or other permits for public entertainment,
permits for dancing schools,
permits for boxing contests,
fees for physician licenses,
fees for private detective licenses,
fees for dog licenses,
unclaimed monies or monies received from the sale of unclaimed
property, and
proceeds from the sale of condemned property.

If nothing else, this lists suggests how some cities partially solved the problem of patrolmen shirking when it came to the enforcement of city licensing laws. Reliance on these sources for revenue was similar in nature to
the use of prizes to fund the navy pension system. This system of funding
had the same disadvantages. Plan liabilities were relatively certain, varying
largely according to the number of participants, their age distribution,
and the generosity of the plan. At the same time revenues were relatively
uncertain, and there was no actuarial reason why the two should balance.
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In retrospect, dancing school permits and dog licenses seem like uncertain
(and unremunerative) assets against which the liabilities of Table 10.1
should be balanced.
To receive a beneWt, the ofWcer typically had to work at least 20 years;
however, in several cities the minimum service required for a beneWts was
25 years or more, and in Los Angeles 35 years of service were required for
a full beneWt. BeneWts were typically determined as some fraction, usually
50 percent, of an ofWcer’s pay at the time of retirement though there were
several notable exceptions. Chicago and Milwaukee purchased an annuity
equal to twice the ofWcer’s contribution, with some credit for interest (see
below), up to 75 percent of the ofWcer’s salary. Chicago also speciWed a
maximum annual retirement beneWt of $2,600. Every city maintained some
type of survivor’s beneWt, though in Baltimore the beneWt was at the discretion of the police commissioner.
There were several other cities that had created pension plans for their
police ofWcers around the turn of the twentieth century, including Camden,
New Jersey; Chattanooga, Tennessee; Columbus, Ohio; Des Moines, Iowa;
Indianapolis, Indiana; Omaha, Nebraska; Rochester, New York; Seattle,
Washington; SpringWeld, Illinois; SpringWeld, Massachusetts; Superior,
Wisconsin and; Toledo, Ohio. These cities were generally smaller than
those in Table 10.1, but their plans were usually similar to the ones in the
table. Interestingly, although the Dallas, Texas city charter explicitly permitted the city to create a pension plan, Dallas had not done so by the time
these data were compiled. Also, police ofWcers in Kansas City, Missouri and
Richmond, Virginia maintained their own private plans through benevolent
societies. Funded by ofWcers’ contributions, the Kansas City plan offered
beneWts on par with those of the plans in Table 10.1, paying $80 per year
for every year of service greater than three up to a maximum annual pension of $1,200. However, the Richmond plan was considerably less secure,
paying whatever “the condition of the fund will warrant.” The payment was
adjusted according to the “demands on the fund” (Squier 1912). It was
exactly this type of uncertainty that a pension “plan” is designed to avoid.
FireWghters in the nation’s largest cities also had pension plans by the
early part of the twentieth century. Table 10.2 contains a summary of Wre
department pension plans. In general, these were similar to those for police
personnel; however, there were some notable differences. For example, all
of the early pension plans in major municipalities for police department
personnel required an employee contribution. In contrast, three of the
major Wre department plans, those in Detroit, New York, and San Francisco,
required no employee contribution. The New York plan is noteworthy
because it was much like that of police ofWcers with one other exception.
New York WreWghters could retire with full beneWts after 20 years while
police ofWcers had to work 25 years unless they were under age 55 at the
time of retirement.
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Another noteworthy difference between police and Wre plans was the fact
that only one of the Wre department plans was explicitly funded in any Wscal
sense of the term. Only Milwaukee had some source of tax revenue explicitly dedicated to fund Wre department pensions, this was the property tax
assessment. As with police pensions, most cities dedicated a number of
minor sources of revenues toward their Wghters’ pensions. These included
but were not limited to the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Wnes imposed on WreWghters for disciplinary purposes,
rewards or donations bestowed for special services or valor,
Wnes imposed for violations of Wre regulations,
a percentage of city license fees,
monies received from the sale of unclaimed property, and
proceeds from the sale of condemned property.

The system of placing Wnes in the retirement fund probably encouraged
enforcement of city Wre ordinances if nothing else. Finally, in several states,
all or part of the tax on Wre insurance premiums was dedicated towards the
WreWghter’s retirement plan. As with the police plans, several of these,
including the plans for Chicago, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis, dated from the
nineteenth century.
There were several smaller cities that maintained plans for their WreWghters. These included: Chattanooga, Tennessee; Columbus, Ohio; Denver,
Colorado; Des Moines, Iowa; Omaha, Nebraska; Rochester, New York;
Seattle, Washington; SpringWeld, Massachusetts; Tacoma, Washington;
Toledo, Ohio; and Superior, Wisconsin. There was one private retirement
plan managed by a benevolent society in St. Paul, Minnesota. The St. Paul
plan paid $40 a month to Wremen over age 50 with 20 years of service. The
Tacoma WreWghters began a private plan in 1902, but it was taken over as
part of the city plan when the state of Washington passed an enabling act
in 1909.
Early municipal plans for other employees were not nearly as common as
they were for policemen and WreWghters. Table 10.3 contains a summary of
pension plans for other municipal employees. Whereas 17 of the 18 largest
cities had police plans and the same number had plans for WreWghters, only
half of these cities had plans for other municipal employees. Curiously, although there were relatively few municipal employee plans at the time,
these tended to be explicitly funded on an actuarially sound basis. Typically, the employee’s annual contribution was a percentage of salary at the
time of retirement. The contribution was based on worker characteristics,
including the age at which the employee entered public service, the employee’s occupation, the employee’s gender, and the expected or “targeted”
pension annuity. The last of these characteristics was typically something
like the product of some fraction, say one sixty-sixth or one one-hundredth

Firemen were N.A.
covered with
other
municipal
employees;
see Table 10.3
946

2,341

Boston

Buffalo

Chicago

2.5% of
annual salary

100% of the
difference
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

100% of the
difference
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

N.A.

N.A.

Employer
contributions

Municipality
pays 100%

Municipality
pays 100%

N.A.

N.A.

Administration
costs

Retirement after
20 years of service
or 50 years of age,
but contributions
must continue
until age 50

20 years of
service with no
age requirements

N.A.

N.A.

Conditions

One-half of
annual salary
at the time of
retirement, with
$600 (annual)
minimum and
$3,000 maximum

One-half of
annual salary at
the time of
retirement

N.A.

N.A.

BeneWt

Widow or other
dependent(s)
receives
Wreman’s
pension or its
equivalent

Widow or other
dependent(s)
receives
Wreman’s
pension or its
equivalent

N.A.

N.A.

Dependent
beneWts

9:35 AM

4% of
annual salary

Firemen were N.A.
covered with
other
municipal
employees;
see Table 10.3

Employee
contributions

2/27/03

Baltimore

Firemen
covered

178

City

Table 10.2. Municipal Fire Department Pension Plans in the United States, c. 1920s
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1,698

Firemen were N.A.
covered with
police
officers;
see Table 10.1

Detroit

Los Angeles

N.A.

No contribution 100% of the
required of
difference
Wremen
between
employee
contributions
and outlays
N.A.

Municipality
pays 100%

Municipality
pays 100%

Municipality
pays 100%

Widow or other
dependent(s)
receives
Wreman’s
pension or its
equivalent

N.A.

N.A.

25 years of service One-half of
with no age
annual salary
requirements
at the time of
retirement

N.A.

Lump-sum
payment of
undetermined
amount

25 years of service One-half of
Widow or other
with no age
annual salary
dependent(s)
requirements
at the time of
receives
retirement, with Wreman’s
$87.66 (monthly) pension or its
minimum and
equivalent
$100 maximum

25 years of service One-half of
with no age
annual salary
requirements
at the time of
retirement, with
$75 (monthly)
minimum and
$100 maximum

9:35 AM

100% of the
difference
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

100% of the
difference
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

2/27/03

$0.50–1.25
per month
depending on
rank

1,061

Cleveland

$0.50 per
month

624

Cincinnati

10Chap10.qxd
Page 179

Early Pension Plans for State and Local Workers
179

723

Milwaukee

No contribution 100% of the
required of
difference
Wremen
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

6,078

New York

100% of the
difference
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

N.A.

1% of annual
salary, plus $1–2
upon the death
of a Wreman

Firemen were N.A.
covered with.
police officers;
see Table 10.1

New Orleans 628

Newark

100% of the
difference
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

Municipality
pays 100%

Municipality
pays 100%

N.A.

Municipality
pays 100%

N.A.

$600 per year
for 20 years of
service; plus a
bonus for each
5-year increment
above 20 years

Annuity equal
to twice the
Wreman’s
accumulated
contributions up
to 75% of
highest annual
salary

BeneWt

20 years of service One-half of
with no age
annual salary
requirements
at the time of
retirement

20 years of service One-half of
with no age
annual salary
requirements
at the time of
retirement

N.A.

Retirement after
20 years of service
or 50 years of age,
but payments do
not begin until
age 50

Retirement after
15 years of service
at age 57; 20 years
at age 50; 10
years at age 50
(with reduced
beneWt)

Conditions

Widow or other
dependent(s)
receives
Wreman’s
pension or its
equivalent

$1,000 lumpsum payment

N.A.

Widow or other
dependent(s)
receives
Wreman’s
pension or its
equivalent

Widow’s
beneWts up to
75% of
Wreman’s
salary, and
$10–15 per
month per child
under age 18

Dependent
beneWts

9:35 AM

$10 initiation
fee and $1.50
per month, plus
plus $1–2 upon
the death of a
Wreman

Administration
costs

Municipality
0.125% of
contributes 9% annual salary
of a Wreman’s
annual salary
to the
retirement fund,
paid by $0.0005
sales tax

Employer
contributions
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3% of
annual salary

Employee
contributions

2/27/03

Minneapolis 513

Firemen
covered

City
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2.5% of annual
salary, plus
$1–2 upon the
the death of
a Wreman

931

940

967

Firemen were N.A.
covered with
police officers;
see Table 10.1

Pittsburgh

St. Louis

San
Francisco

Washington

100% of the
difference
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

100% of the
difference
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

N.A.

Municipality
pays 100%

N.A.

Retirement after
25 years of service; 20 years at
age 55

N.A.

One-half of
annual salary at
the time of
retirement

20 years of service $600 per year
with no age
requirements

N.A.

Widow or other
dependent(s)
receives
Wreman’s
pension or its
equivalent

Widow or other
dependent(s)
receives
Wreman’s
pension or its
equivalent

$1,100 lumpsum payment

Widow or other
dependent(s)
receives
Wreman’s
pension or its
equivalent

Early Pension Plans for State and Local Workers

Source: Monthly Labor Review, various issues.

N.A.

No contribution 100% of the
required of
difference
Wremen
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

One-half of
average annual
salary during
the last four
years of service

20 years of service $50 to $75 per
with no age
month
requirements
depending on
rank at
retirement

Retirement after
20 years of service or 45 years
of age

9:35 AM

Municipality
pays 100%

Municipality
pays 100%

Municipality
pays 100%

2/27/03

$5 initiation fee 100% of the
and $2 per
difference
month
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

1 day’s pay
annually

Philadelphia 2,100
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of the employee’s average annual salary during his last Wve years of service
and the number of years of service at, say, age 60. The city typically purchased an annuity of (roughly) equal value to the worker’s accumulated
monies, with interest. We say “roughly” because the worker’s contribution
in any particular year was based on estimations of future earnings, time to
retirement, and so forth. Furthermore, exactly where the city obtained its
half of the annuity’s value was seldom explicitly determined, a point we consider is some detail below.
In addition to this innovation, these plans essentially ushered in the era
of the deWned beneWt pension plans in which the beneWt was based on years
of service and end-of-career earnings, a feature that was to become increasingly common. For example, in New York, a broad class of public workers
received one-seventieth of the average of their last Wve years of service multiplied by the number of years of service. Thus the beneWt for a worker with
35 years on the job would have been approximately 50 percent of the average salary at the end of her career. These features are not unlike any number of contemporary public sector pension plans.
After police ofWcers and WreWghters, the other major group of municipal
workers to receive a pension plan was teachers. Despite a strong commitment, by any historical or contemporary standard, to public education, the
United States was quite late in offering universal old-age pensions to its
public schoolteachers. For a comparison, consider that, by 1911, at least
twenty countries around the world had created pension plans for their public schoolteachers. England, France, Saxony, and even Russia had done so
before 1860 (Squier 1912). At the same time, only roughly one-third of the
states in the United States had some type of pension plan for at least some
of their teachers—though the number of states with a plan was growing. By
the late 1920s, 23 of the states maintained pension plans for their teachers.
Four other states passed legislation allowing individual school districts to
provide plans for their teachers. In one state, Missouri, the teachers themselves organized a plan. The majority of these plans were created between
1896 and 1911, during the height of the Progressive movement. Prior to this
time, indeed dating back into the late nineteenth century, a number of local
school districts provided pension plans for their teachers, and several of the
country’s larger cities maintained pension plans for their teachers separately from the state plans.
It would be easy to misinterpret and make too much of the fact that local
school districts typically offered pensions to their teachers before overall
state plans were adopted. The nature of state and local public Wnance in
most states required enabling acts by the state legislatures before local
school boards could create pension plans. Schools were typically Wnanced
largely through local property taxes, and local boards of education administered the school districts. However, the state oversaw the actual spending
by local school districts. For local school boards to establish a pension plan

Municipal
Annual
employees,
contribution
including
is actuarially
Wremen and
determined
teachers; for
police pensions,
see Table 10.1
Municipal
4% of annual
employees,
salary
including
police ofWcers,
WreWghters,
and teachers
Only police
N.A.
ofWcers and
WreWghters were
covered; see
Tables 10.1
and 10.2.
Municipal
3.25% of
employees
annual salary
other than
police ofWcers,
WreWghters,
and teachers;
see Tables 10.1,
10.2 and 10.4

Boston

Buffalo

Chicago

Employee
contributions

Baltimore

City

Municipal
workers
covered
Administration
costs

N.A.

Actuarially
0.10% of
determined
annual salary
based on
expected future
beneWts

N.A.

N.A.

10 years of service Determined by
with no age
the product of
requirements
of service
and salary, up
to $1,800

N.A.

Employee has
the option of
receiving a
smaller pension
in return for a
guaranteed
survivor’s
beneWt

Dependent
beneWts

Male employees
contribute 1%
of their annual
salaries for a
widow’s annuity

N.A.

Determined by N.A.
the product of
service multipliers,
years of service,
and salary, with a
minimum of $480

Determined
by the product
of service
multipliers,
years of service,
and salary

BeneWt

9:35 AM

Retirement
optional at age
60, mandatory at
70, with no years
of service
requirement

Retirement
optional at age
60, mandatory at
70, with no years
of service
requirement

Conditions

2/27/03

Actuarially
N.A.
determined
based on
expected future
beneWts

Actuarially
Municipality
determined
100%
based on
expected future
beneWts

Employer
contributions

Table 10.3. Municipal Employees’ Pension Plans in the United States, c. 1920s
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Only police
N.A.
ofWcers and
WreWghters were
covered; see
Tables 10.1
and 10.2.
Only police
N.A.
ofWcers and
WreWghters were
covered; see
Tables 10.1
and 10.2.
Municipal
No contribution
employees
required of
other than
municipal
police ofWcers, employees
WreWghters,
and teachers;
see Tables 10.1,
10.2, and 10.3
Only police
N.A.
ofWcers and
WreWghters were
covered; see
Tables 10.1,

Cleveland

Detroit

Los Angeles

N.A.

Municipality
pays 100%

N.A.

Municipality
pays 100%

N.A.

N.A.

Administration
costs

N.A.

25 years of service with no age
requirement; only
15 years of service required for
age 70

N.A.

N.A.

Conditions

N.A.

One-half of
annual salary at
the time of
retirement, with
with a $900
maximum

N.A.

N.A.

BeneWt

N.A.

Employee has
the option of
receiving a
smaller pension
in return for a
guaranteed
survivor’s
beneWt

N.A.

N.A.

Dependent
beneWts

9:35 AM

N.A.

N.A.

Employer
contributions

2/27/03

Cincinnati

Employee
contributions

184

City

Municipal
workers
covered
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N.A.

Actuarially
Municipality
determined
pays 100%
based on
expected
future beneWts

Municipal
Annual
employees
contribution
other than
is actuarially
police ofWcers, determined
WreWghters,
and teachers;
see Tables 10.1,
10.2 and 10.4

New York

N.A.

N.A.

New Orleans Only police
N.A.
ofWcers and
WreWghters were
covered; see
Tables 10.1, 10.2.
and 10.4

N.A.

N.A.

Retirement
optional 58–60,
depending on
occupation,
mandatory at 70,
with no years of
service
requirement

N.A.

N.A.

Retirement
optional at age
62 (60 for
women),
mandatory at 72
(70), with no
years of service
requirement

N.A.

Determined by
the product of
service multipliers, years
years of service,
and salary

N.A.

N.A.

Determined by
the product of
service multipliers, years
years of service,
and salary;
exempt workers
face a $500

N.A.

Employee has
the option of
receiving a
smaller pension
in return for a
guaranteed
survivor’s
beneWt

N.A.

N.A.

Employee has
the option of
receiving a
smaller pension
in return for a
guaranteed
survivor’s
beneWt

N.A.

9:35 AM

Only police
N.A.
ofWcers and
WreWghters were
covered; see
Tables 10.1

Actuarially
Municipality
determined
pays 100%
based on
expected
future beneWts

N.A.

2/27/03

Newark

Workers earning
less than $750
are exempt;
above that the
annual
contribution is
actuarially
determined

Only police
N.A.
ofWcers and
WreWghters were
covered; see
Tables 10.1, 10.2
and 10.4.

Minneapolis Municipal
employees
other than
police ofWcers,
WreWghters,
and teachers;
see Tables
10.1, 10.2,
10.4

Milwaukee

10Chap10.qxd
Page 185

Early Pension Plans for State and Local Workers
185

100% of the
difference
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

Pittsburgh

Municipal
4% of annual
employees
salary up to $48
other than
per year
police ofWcers
and WreWghters
see Tables 10.1
and 10.2

100% of the
difference
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

Employer
contributions

Philadelphia Municipal
2.5% of annual
employees
salary up to $72
other than
per year
police ofWcers
and WreWghters;
see Tables 10.1
and 10.2

Employee
contributions

Municipality
pays 100%

Municipality
pays 100%

Administration
costs

Retirement after
20 years of service
and 60 years of
age; earlier
retirement with
contributions to
age 60

20 years of service and 60 years
of age

Conditions

One-half of
annual salary at
the time of
retirement, with
a $1,200
maximum

One-half of
annual salary at
the time of
of retirement,
with a $1,200
maximum

BeneWt

Employee has
the option of
receiving a
smaller pension
in return for a
guaranteed
survivor’s
beneWt

Employee has
the option of
receiving a
smaller pension
in return for a
guaranteed
survivor’s
beneWt

Dependent
beneWts

9:35 AM

City

186

Municipal
workers
covered

2/27/03
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Municipal
Annual
employees
contribution
(and teachers) is actuarially
other than
determined
police ofWcers
and WreWghters;
see Tables 10.1
and 10.2
Only police
N.A.
ofWcers and
WreWghters were
covered; see
Tables 10.1,
and 10.4

San
Francisco

Washington

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

Actuarially
Municipality
determined
pays 100%
based on
expected
future beneWts

N.A.

N.A.

10 years of service and 62 years
of age, or at age
60 with 30 years
of service;
mandatory
retirement at 70

N.A.

N.A.

Determined by
the product of
service
multipliers,
years of service,
and salary, with
a minimum
of $480

N.A.

N.A.

Employee has
the option of
receiving a
smaller pension
in return for a
guaranteed
survivor’s
beneWt

N.A.

9:35 AM

Sources: Monthly Labor Review, various issues.

Only
N.A.
WreWghters
were covered;
see Table 10.2.

2/27/03

St. Louis
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that was Wnanced on either a pay-as-you-go or a funded basis would have
typically exceeded their mandates and their capacity to Wnance such a plan.
The New York state legislature had considered enabling legislation since
1879; however, it was not until 1894 and 1895 that acts permitted New York
City and Brooklyn, respectively, to offer a pension plan to their teachers.
Over the next decade or so at least seven other cities, including Albany,
Buffalo, Elmira, Rochester, Schenectady, Syracuse, and Troy, received approval to offer plans. However, with the exception of the New York City system, these plans were eventually reorganized and subsumed by the New
York state pension plan of 1921.
This pattern for development of local pension plans was repeated elsewhere. In 1907, the Indiana legislature created a plan for teachers in the
city of Indianapolis, and in the same year the Illinois legislature created a
plan for Chicago. In 1909, Denver and Omaha received state approval of
plans for their teachers, as did New Haven, Connecticut in 1911. Shortly
thereafter, both Kansas and Utah passed enabling legislation that permitted cities of a certain size or “class” to establish pensions for their teachers.
In some cases, such as Connecticut, Indiana, and New York, the city plans
were absorbed into subsequent state plans. In others, such as New York City
and Chicago, the municipal plan remained more or less intact and separate
from the broader state plans.
By 1928, there were at least twelve major municipalities, which were offering, or recently had offered, a pension plan to their teachers. Of these
twelve, three—Denver, Omaha, and New Orleans—were in states that did
not have separate plans for their teachers. Eleven of these municipal pension plans for teachers are summarized in Table 10.4. We omit the Denver
plan, which was a disability plan, though inWrmities associated with old age
were considered disabilities. It paid $30 a month to “disabled” teachers.
Some of the teachers’ plans in Table 10.4 do not look all that different from
those for either police or Wre or other municipal personnel. Indeed, in
three of the cities teachers were on the same plan as other municipal workers. However, several of the teachers’ plans contain two characteristics not
associated with the plans for other workers. One is the graduated nature of
the teacher’s contribution; that is, it rises with income and experience. The
other is the willingness of the cities to accept time on the job in other school
districts as credit toward the pension beneWt. Note that none of the pension
plans for police ofWcers, WreWghters, or other personnel explicitly contained such provisions.
It is difWcult to offer a logical economic explanation for the graduated
nature of these beneWts. If one had the actual salaries by seniority for workers in a graduated plan like that of, say, Michigan or Minnesota, the dollar
amounts contributed by the teacher could be converted to a percentage
of annual earnings. These percentages could then be compared to the
contributions of teachers and other city workers to see who was actually
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contributing a larger proportion of their salaries to their pensions. The
counting of service in other school districts in the calculation of the city
pension may have been related to the changing nature of the academic
labor market. Schoolteaching had become an acceptable occupation for
women in the previous generation, and this provision for counting other
service might be an example of municipalities lowering the cost of married
teachers moving (presumably with their working spouses) to the city. Since
women were often forced to resign from teaching when they married, it is
likely that another factor was involved. More likely, giving credit for time in
another system was related to the large scale rural-to-urban migration of
the era. In a time of rapid urbanization, this feature of these plans may
have been designed to encourage rural and small town teachers to migrate
to the city with their students.

Early State Pensions
In many states, general old-age relief plans, like Social Security, antedated
pension plans for the state employees. Indeed, the states antedated the
federal government by more than a decade in offering general old-age
relief. Arizona abolished its “almshouses” and replaced them with “outdoor
relief” in the form of a general pension plan in 1915, but it was quickly
declared unconstitutional (Schneider 1937). Alaska also created a plan in
1915, and Montana, Nevada, and Pennsylvania did so in 1925. The last
of these was subsequently declared unconstitutional, though a constitutional amendment rectiWed that situation in 1934, on the eve of the creation of the federal Social Security plan. In general, progress was slow until
the Depression. By 1929 there were only 1,003 elderly individuals receiving
old-age support from Wve states (Millis and Montgomery 1938). However,
by 1934, 28 states and two territories had some type of state social security
plan. Four more plans were added in 1935. A contemporary review of these
plans noted that there were over 400,000 elderly individuals receiving state
beneWts at the time the federal Social Security plan was created. The beneWts were minimal, ranging from $1.08 (North Dakota) to $27.74 (Nevada)
(Schneider 1937).
When compared with the timing of the passage of enabling legislation
for local teacher pension plans adopted by cities, the states were quite slow
to establish pension plans for their civil service employees. However, after
individual municipalities began adopting plans for their teachers in the
early twentieth century, the states moved fairly aggressively in the 1910s and
1920s to create or consolidate plans for their other teachers. Table 10.5
contains a summary of 21 of the 24 state plans in existence in the late 1920s.
Before turning to a comparison of the plans in the table, Wrst consider
the plans not listed there. Recall from above that 28 states in all had at
least some public schoolteachers covered by a plan. In Colorado, Kansas,

Teachers were N.A.
covered with
other municipal
employees;
see Table 10.3
11,927

6,300

Boston

Chicago

Detroit

3% of annual
salary up to
to $1,500

Administration
expenses are
are paid from
interest on the
assets of the
fund

N.A.

N.A.

Administration
costs

Municipality
Administration
contributes
expenses are
daily interest
paid from
on balances in interest on the
the teachers’
fund
salary fund plus
nonresident
student tuition

Municipality
contritbutes
$2 for each $1
contributed
by teachers

N.A.

N.A.

Employer
contributions

30 years of service (last 20 of
which must be
in Detroit)

25 years of
service (15 of
which must be
in Chicago),
increased beneWt
up to 35 years

N.A.

N.A.

Conditions

N.A.

N.A.

Dependent
beneWts

$1,200 annually No provision
for dependents

$800 annually
No provision
after 25 years
for dependents
of service,
increased by $20
per for every year
over 25 up to
$1,000

N.A.

N.A.

BeneWt

9:35 AM

$1 monthly for
the Wrst 4 years,
$1.50 monthly
for the next 4
years, $2.50 for
the next 4, and
$5 thereafter

Teachers were N.A.
covered with
other municipal
employees;
see Table 10.3

Employee
contributions

2/27/03

Baltimore

Teachers
covered
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City
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Annual
contribution
is actuarially
determined

New York

Actuarially
Municipality
determined
100%
based on
expected
future beneWts

Appropriates Department of
3% of teachers’ education pays
salaries, with a 100%
minimum
appropriation
of $3000

Administration
expenses are
paid from
interest on the
assets of the
fund

Administration
expenses are
paid from
interest on the
assets of the
fund

35 years of service
(20 of which must
be in New York),
mandatory
retirement at
age 70

Must be age 65
or older and have
at least 40 years
of service, with
beneWt reduced
by 1/40 per year
to 75%

No age or service
requirements,
though beneWts
cannot begin
until age 50

Must be age 62
or older and have
at least 25 years
of service
(15 Milwaukee),
or 35 years of
service
Employee has
the option of
receiving a
smaller pension
in return for a
guaranteed
survivor’s
beneWt

An annuity
equal in value
to the sum of
the employee’s
and city’s
contributions

Employee has
the option of
receiving a
smaller pension
in return for a
guaranteed
survivor’s
benefit

One-half of
No provision
annual salary at for dependents
the time of
retirement after
40 years of service,
$300 minimum and
$600 maximum

An annuity
equal in value
to the sum of
the employee’s
and city’s
contributions

$600 annually
No provision
after 25 years
for dependents
of service,
increased by $20
per for every year
over 25 up to
$900

9:35 AM

25,995

2% of annual
salary

New Orleans 1,619

Actuarially
determined
based on
expected
future beneWts

$4 monthly for 45% of surtax
the Wrst 10 years, on incomes
$6 monthly for above $3,000
for the next 5
years, $8 monthly
thereafter
5% of annual
salary for
teachers over
the age of 25

2,054

2/27/03

Minneapolis 2,344

Milwaukee
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Teachers were N.A.
covered with
other municipal
employees;
see Table 10.3
2,761

San
Francisco

Washington

Sources: Monthly Labor Review, various issues.

N.A.

Actuarially
Department of
determined
education pays
based on
100%
expected
future beneWts

N.A.

Must be age 62
and have at least
10 years of
service, and
100% of service
after age 52,
mandatory at
age 70

N.A.

35 years of service
(20 of which must
be in Omaha),
with retirement
after 20 years due
to disabilty

Conditions

An annuity
equal in value
to the sum of
the employee’s
and city’s
contributions

N.A.

$500 annually
with 35 years,
reduced
proportionally
for early
retirement due
to disability

BeneWt

No provision
for dependents

N.A.

Employee has
the option of
receiving a
smaller pension
in return for a
guaranteed
survivor’s
beneWt

Dependent
beneWts

9:35 AM

Annual
contribution is
actuarially
determined

Administration
costs

1–1.5% of
N.A.
state teacher
salary
appropriations
plus 1–1.5 times
that amount
“as needed”

Employer
contributions

2/27/03

N.A.

N.A.

Omaha

Employee
contributions

Teachers
covered

City
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Nebraska, and Oregon, the state legislatures had passed acts that enabled
either speciWc cities or speciWc “classes” of cities, which, as we have seen,
was often the same thing, to establish pension plans for their teachers. In
Kansas and Oregon, the “Wrst class” cities, typically deWned according to
population and/or municipal services offered, were permitted to create
pension plans, though in practice they were quite slow to do so.
The other three states not shown in the table were Missouri, West
Virginia, and Utah. In Missouri, the teachers themselves organized a plan
in 1907. Teachers contributed up to one percent of their salary; males could
retire after 30 years and females after 25 years; and pension beneWts were
determined by an executive committee and the board of trustees. In 1907,
West Virginia established that teachers who had served 30 consecutive years
could be placed on the “substitute teachers’ list” at three-quarters pay.
Although nominally still eligible for service, they were apparently rarely
called upon, essentially leaving them with a retirement pension. Finally,
Utah passed legislation enabling every school district in the state to establish a pension plan for its teachers, but as late as 1912 only Salt Lake City
had done so.
For the 21 states that offered a general state teachers’ plan by the 1920s,
data in the table allow one to compare and contrast the different features in
the various state plans. The most striking aspect of these state pension plans
for teachers is that they seem to have a little of everything. There doesn’t
seem to be any feature of the municipal plans that is not a feature of at least
one state plan. There were, however, a few features of the state plans that were
not observed elsewhere. Some of the more interesting features include:
•

•

•
•

In two states, Michigan and Montana, the state made no contribution.
These systems were like the older, nineteenth-century public sector pension plans, which were really nothing more than forced savings plans.
They also resembled the private plans established by the workers themselves in the absence of an employer-provided plan.
In two states, Arizona and Rhode Island, teachers made no contribution,
and the state paid teachers’ pensions on a pay-as-you-go basis from general revenues.
In four states—Arizona, California, Montana, and Nevada—teachers
received a Xat $500 or $600 annual pension.
Finally, like the municipal plans, the state plans generally did not contain
dependent beneWts.

As for other state employees, by 1930 only six states offered pension plans
to their civil servants. Massachusetts was the Wrst state to do so; however,
the Massachusetts plan was not adopted until 1911. In its essential features,
the plan was similar to those that would be created by a number of states
and local governments over subsequent decades. Indeed some of the plans

38,888

Actuarially
State paid
determined
100%
based on
expected
future beneWts

5% of the state State paid
inheritance
100%
tax

$5 annually for State teachers’ State paid
the Wrst 10 years, retirement tax 100%
$10 for the next
5 years, and $30
for the next
10 years

$12 annually

State paid
100%

Administration
costs

Illinois

36,108

California

No contribution State paid
required of
100%
teachers

Employer
contributions
$600 annually

BeneWt

Retirement after
25 years of service
(in state, outside
Chicago and
Peoria) and 50
years of age

Retirement after
15 years of service
(in state) and 60
years of age;
mandatory at
age 70

$16 for each
year of service,
with a $400
maximum

Determined by
the product of
service
multipliers,
years of service,
and salary, with
with $350 min
and $1,000 max

Retirement after $500 annually
30 years of service
(15 of which,
including the
last ten, must
have been in
the state)

25 years of service with no age
requirements

Conditions

No provision
for dependents

Employee has
the option of
receiving a
smaller pension
in return for a
guaranteed
survivor’s
beneWt

No provision
for dependents

No provision
for dependents

Dependent
beneWts

9:35 AM

5% of annual
salary, with a
$25 annual
minimum and
$100 maximum

N.A.

Arizona

Employee
contributions

2/27/03

Connecticut 9,749

Teachers
covered
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N.A.

N.A.
.

Maine

Maryland

5% of annual
salary, with a
$35 annual
minimum and
$100 maximum

Actuarially
State paid
determined
100%
based on
expected
future beneWts

Actuarially
State paid
determined
100%
based on
expected
future beneWts

State matches State paid
employee’s
100%
contribution
plus 100% of
liabilities accrued
before the plan
was in place

Actuarially
State paid
determined
100%
based on
expected
future beneWts

Must be age 60
or older to begin
drawing beneWt,
mandatory at
age 70

Must be age 60 or
older to begin
drawing beneWt,
mandatory at
age 70

Must be age 60 or
older and have at
least 30 years of
service

Full retirement
beneWts after
40 years (75% in
state), partial
beneWts after 25
years, and 60
years of age

Determined by
the product of
service multipliers, years of
service, and
salary, with
$1,000
maximum

Determined by
the product of
service
multipliers,
years of service,
and salary

Annuity equal
to twice the
value of the
employee’s
contribution

Determined by
the product of
service multipliers, years of
service, and
salary, with
with $131 min
and $700 max

Employee has
the option of
receiving a
smaller pension
in return for a
guaranteed
survivor’s
beneWt

Employee has
the option of
receiving a
smaller pension
in return for a
guaranteed
survivor’s
beneWt

No provision
for dependents

No provision
for dependents

9:35 AM

4.08–7.75% of
annual salary
based on sex,
age and length
of service

5% of annual
salary

$18.04–32.45
annually based
on age at
entrance and
actuarial
calculations
based on a
$300 beneWt

2/27/03

Massachusetts 20,019

12,341

Indiana
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Teachers
covered
24,471

16,866

5,600

N.A.

Michigan

Minnesota

Montana

Nevada

State paid
100%

Administration
costs

$12 annually

$1 for each
month school
is in session

100% of the
difference
between
employee

No state
contributions

State paid
100%

State paid
100%

Dependent
beneWts

$600 annually

No provision
for dependents

No provision
for dependents

$350 annually
No provision
after 20 years
for dependents
of service,
increased to $500
for 25 years
of service

One-half of
No provision
annual salary at for dependents
the time of
retirement,
with $300
minimum and
$500 maximum

BeneWt

Retirement after $600 annually
30 years of service
(15 of which must
have been in the
state)

Must have paid
at least $600
into the

Retirement after
20 years of service
(15 of which
must have been
in the state)

Full retirement
beneWts after 30
years (15 in state),
partial beneWts
after 25 years,
and 60 years of
age

Conditions

9:35 AM

$5 annually for State teachers’ State paid
the Wrst 5 years, retirement tax 100%
$10 for the next
5 years, $20 for
the next 10 years,
and $30 for the
next 5

No state
contributions

Employer
contributions

2/27/03

1% up to $10
annually for the
Wrst 5 years, 2%
to $20 for the
next 10 years,
and 3% to $30
for the next
15 years

Employee
contributions

196

City
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19,830

39,648

8,226

42,972

New Jersey

New York

North
Dakota

Ohio

4% of annual
salary up to
$2,000

1% up to $10
annually for the
the Wrst 10 years,
and 2% up to
$40 for the
next 15 years
Actuarially
$1 annually
determined
paid by
based on
teachers
expected
future beneWts

$0.10 annually State paid
contributed
100%
from the
general fund
for each child
between the ages
of 6 and 21

State paid
100%

Must be age 60
or older to begin
drawing beneWt,
mandatory at
age 70

Determined by
the product of
service
multipliers,
years of service,
and salary, with
$300 minimum

Determined by
the product of
service multipliers, years
of service, and
salary, with
$400 minimum

Determined by
the product of
service
multipliers,
years of service,
and salary

Employee has
the option of
receiving a
smaller pension
in return for a
guaranteed
survivor’s
beneWt

Employee has
the option of
receiving a
smaller pension
in return for a
guaranteed
survivor’s
beneWt

Employee has
the option of
receiving a
smaller pension
in return for a
guaranteed
survivor’s
beneWt
Retirement after 2% of Wnal
No provision
25 years of service salary with $250 for dependents
(18 of which must minimum and
have been in the $700 maximum
state)

Retirement after
25 years of service
and 60 years of
age, or 35 years
of service,
mandatory at
age 70

Must be age 62 or
older to begin
drawing beneWt,
mandatory at
age 70

9:35 AM

Actuarially
determined
based on
expected
beneWts

Actuarially
State paid
determined
100%
based on
expected
future beneWts

2/27/03

4% of annual
salary

3.60–7.42% of
annual salary
based on sex,
age and length
of service
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Actuarially
determined
based on
expected
future beneWts

5% of annual
salary, with a
$16 annual
minimum and
$100 maximum

Vermont

Fund is
maintained by
by donations
and interest
on past
donations

State paid
100%

Retirement after
30 years of service (20 of which
must have been
in state)and age
65 for men
(60 for women)

Retirement after
35 years of service
(25 of which must
have been in
the state)

Retirement after
10 years of service
and 62 years of
age, mandatory
at age 70

Conditions

Employee has
the option of
receiving a
smaller pension
in return for a
guaranteed
survivor’s
beneWt

Dependent
beneWts

Determined by No provision
the product of
for dependents
service
multipliers,
years of service,
and salary

One-half of
No provision
annual salary
for dependents
at the time of
retirement, with
$500 minimum
and $700
maximum

Determined by
the product of
service
multipliers,
years of service,
and salary

BeneWt

9:35 AM

2,956

No contribution State paid
required of
100%
teachers

Rhode Island 3,599

Administration
costs

Actuarially
State paid
determined
100%
based on
expected
future beneWts

Employer
contributions

3.33–6.59%
of annual salary
based on sex,
age and length
of service

Employee
contributions

Pennsylvania 58,409

Teachers
covered

2/27/03

City
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18,054

Wisconsin

5% of annual
salary for
teachers over
the age of 25

1% of annual
salary plus a
special
assessment for
those with total
contributions
below a speciWed
minimum
Actuarially
determined
based on
expected
future beneWts, paid by a
state teachers’
retirement\ tax

100% of the
difference
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

Retirement after
30 years of service (all in state)
and age 58 for
men (60 for
women)

AdministraNo age or service
tion expenses requirements
are paid from
interest on the
assets of the fund

State paid
100%

Determined by
the product of
service
multipliers,
years of service,
and salary

Employee has
the option of
receiving a
smaller pension
in return for a
guaranteed
survivor’s
beneWt

One-half of
No provision
annual salary
for dependents
at the time of
retirement, with
$500 maximum

9:35 AM

Sources: Monthly Labor Review, various issues.

N.A.
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Virginia
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already discussed above used the Massachusetts plan as a blueprint. The
plan required all qualiWed employees to contribute up to 5 percent of their
salaries to a pension “trust.” Under the Massachusetts plan a state employee
could retire upon reaching age 60 and retirement was mandatory at age 70.
At retirement, the state purchased an annuity in the retiree’s name equal to
twice the value of the employee’s accumulated contribution with interest.
Thus, in theory the state paid 50 percent of each employee’s pension, which
makes this plan not all that different from current so-called cash balance
plans. The Massachusetts plan was submitted before the House Committee on Reform in the Civil Service during testimony on a Civil Service
Retirement bill in 1912 (U.S. House of Representatives 1912), and it served
as a model for the U.S. civil service pension plan created in 1920.
Table 10.6 contains a summary of the six state plans in effect in the late
1920s.3 Notice that in Maine no contribution was required from state
employees, but a pension beneWt was at the discretion of the governor. Little
else was unique among the features of the various state plans. One of the
interesting and progressive features of the New York plan was that smaller
political units such as cities and counties could enroll their employees in
the state retirement plan on par with the state workers, making it a truly
state plan. To fully appreciate and understand such an arrangement, recall
that the connection between the state pension plans and municipal, and
county, employees results from a fundamental characteristic of public
Wnance in the United States. Counties and cities were generally creations of
the states, although these subordinate political units exercised their authority to collect certain taxes and provide certain services. Even though they
maintained their own balance sheets, debts and so forth, the states were
typically the de facto receivers of subordinate units that became Wscally
insolvent. Hence the states had a vested interest in overseeing the management of, say, a municipality’s police pension fund. Given this interest, it is
not surprising that the states simply offered cities the option of enrolling
their workers in a common state plan.
This summary of state pension plans suggests that, of all of the political
units in the United States, the states themselves were the slowest to create
pension plans for their civil service workers. However, this observation is
slightly misleading. In 1930, 40 percent of all state and local employees were
schoolteachers, and 21 (24 depending on what one calls a “pension”) of the
states, including the most populous states at the time, maintained a plan for
their teachers. Of the roughly 400,000 state employees covered by a pension
plan in 1929, 370,000 were teachers (Millis and Montgomery 1938). There
were also 7,600 college and university professors covered by the Carnegie
fund teachers’ retirement plan. While public sector pensions at the state
and local level were far from universal by the 1920s, they did cover a substantial proportion of public sector workers, and that proportion was growing rapidly in the early decades of the twentieth century.

2,883

State paid
100%

State paid
100%

State paid
100%

Administration
costs

State matches State paid
employee’s
100%
contribution
plus 100% of
liabilities
accrued before
the plan was
in place

100% of the
difference
between
employee
contributions
and outlays

No contribution State paid
required of state 100%
employees

Annual
contribution
is actuarially
determined

Maine

Employer
contributions

No contribution State paid
required of state 100%
employees

New Jersey

N.A.

Connecticut

Employee
contributions

Dependent
beneWts

50% of the
No provision
average salary
for dependents
during the last
Wve years of
service, 75% for
40 years of service

BeneWt

Must be age 60
or older to
begin drawing
benefit
mandatory at 70

35 years of service with no age
requirement;
only 15 years of
service required
for age 60,
mandatory at 70

Determined by
the product of
servic multipliers, years
of service,
and salary

Annuity equal
to twice the
value of the
employee’s contribution, with
$300 minimum
and 50%
maximum

Employee has
the option of
of receiving a
smaller pension
in return for
guaranteed
survivor’s
benefit

Employee has
the option of
of receiving a
smaller pension
in return for
guaranteed
survivor’s
benefit

25 years of service At governor’s
No provision
with a “good
discretion, but
for dependents
record”
not to exceed
50% of the average
salary of the last
Wve years

30 years of service with no age
requirement;
only 20 years
of service required for age 70

Conditions

9:35 AM

5% of annual
salary up to
$1,560

N.A.

City

2/27/03

Massachusetts 8,693

State
employees
covered

Table 10.6. State Employees’ Pension Plans, c. 1920s
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58,409

New York

Pennsylvania

Annual
contribution
is actuarially
determined

Annual
contribution
is actuarially
determined

Employee
contributions

Administration
costs

State matches State paid
employee’s
100%
contribution
plus 100% of
liabilities
accrued before
the plan was
in place

State matches State paid
employee’s
100%
contribution
plus 100% of
liabilities
accrued before
the plan was
in place

Employer
contributions

Must be age 60
or older and have
at least 5 years
of service

Must be age 60
or older to
begin drawing
benefit
mandatory at 70

Conditions

Determined by
the product of
service
multipliers,
years of service,
and salary

Determined by
the product of
servic multipliers, years of
service, and
salary

BeneWt

Employee has
the option of
of receiving a
smaller pension
in return for
guaranteed
survivor’s
benefit

Employee has
the option of
of receiving a
smaller pension
in return for
guaranteed
survivor’s
benefit

Dependent
beneWts

9:35 AM

Sources: Monthly Labor Review, various issues.

19,996

City

2/27/03

State
employees
covered
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Funding Early State and Local Pension Plans
In the previous sections, the term “funded pension” was used to mean a
pension plan that had a speciWc source of public revenues dedicated to pay
for the plan’s liabilities. In addition, from time to time in this and other
chapters, the term “actuarially sound” has been used to describe a pension
plan in which the present value of tangible assets was roughly equal to the
present value of expected liabilities. Most of the plans discussed above
required a contribution from the employees covered by the plan, and this
represented a partial funding of the plans with such a feature. However, this
ignores the state or municipality’s share of pension liabilities. As noted,
only a few of the plans reviewed were “fully” funded in this sense. Many
were not funded at all; and fewer still were actuarially sound. Of course, in
another sense, all public sector pension plans are implicitly funded and
actuarially sound in the sense that they are backed by the coercive powers
of the state. Through its monopoly of taxation, the state can collect whatever revenues are required to meet its liabilities, and so the pension promise
is based on the taxing power of the government. Although this is exactly
how these plans were ultimately Wnanced, this is not what is typically meant
by the term “funded plan.” Still, an important part of the history of state
and local pensions revolves around exactly what happened to the funds
(mostly employee contributions) that were maintained on behalf of the
public sector workers.
In at least one respect, the chronic underfunding of most of the early
state and municipal pension plans in understandable. When the plans
were created, initially there were very few recipients, so the “pay-as-you-go”
nature of the plans presented no short-run burden on state or municipal
Wnances. Of course, in an actuarial sense, the plans were grossly underfunded, but the politicians who created the plans, and who were ultimately
responsible to voters for the plans’ success, could afford to wait, often for
many years, before addressing funding. Given the vagaries of political life,
it was quite likely that the politicians in question would not be the same
politicians who had to face the inevitable funding crisis a generation or two
down the road. In this, as in other respects, the history of these early public sector plans mirrors that of Social Security.
Although the maintenance and operation of the state and local pension
funds varied greatly during this era, to examine this issue, we review the
operation of the Connecticut state teachers plan. It was considered, along
with the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania plans, as a good, though not ideal,
pension plan by contemporaries (Studenski 1920). As noted in Table 10.5,
the law required a contribution of up to 5 percent of earnings from workers.
This contribution was to be deposited in an “annuity fund,” and the assets
of the fund were to be invested “in accordance with the laws of the state governing the investment of savings bank funds,” which we discuss below.4 The
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investments of the fund were to be credited “regular interest,” which was
deWned as “the rate determined by the retirement board, and shall be substantially that which is actually earned by the fund of the retirement association.” This “rate” varied from state to state. In Connecticut it was literally
a realized rate—that is, a market rate. In Massachusetts, it was initially set
at 3 percent by the retirement board, but subsequently it became a realized
rate, which turned out to be roughly 4 percent in the late 1910s. In Pennsylvania, the rate was set by law at 4 percent. In addition, all three state
acts created a “pension fund,” which contained the state’s contribution to
the workers’ retirement annuity. In Connecticut and Massachusetts, this
fund simply consisted of “such amounts as shall be appropriated by the general assembly from time to time.” In other words, the state’s share of the
pension was on a “pay-as-you-go” basis. In Pennsylvania, however, the state
actually contributed 2.8 percent of a teacher’s salary semi-annually to the
state pension fund.
With respect to funding, Massachusetts took a different approach with its
teachers’ pension plan. The original Massachusetts teachers plan worked
much like its original plan for civil servants. The retirement annuity was
twice the accumulated value of a teacher’s contributions with interest as
noted. This plan was subsequently revised, and its replacement, the plan in
Table 10.5, is a traditional deWned beneWt plan based on years of service, a
service multiplier (or “generosity parameter”), and end-of-career salary. By
the late 1920s the state’s contribution to the teachers’ pension fund was
based on actuarial calculations. The Wrst states to adopt such a plan were
New Jersey, Ohio, and Vermont (Studenski 1920). What this meant in practice was that the state essentially estimated its expected future liability based
on a worker’s experience, age, earnings, life expectancy, and so forth, and
then deposited that amount into the pension fund. This was originally
referred to as a “scientiWc” pension plan. These were truly funded and actuarially sound deWned beneWt plans. They represent a landmark in the history of public sector pension plans.
As noted, several of the early plans paid an annuity based on the performance of the pension fund. The return on the fund’s portfolio is important
because it would ultimately determine the soundness of the funding scheme
and in some cases the actual annuity the worker would receive. Even the
funded, deWned beneWt plans determined the worker’s and the employer’s
contributions in conjunction with expected earnings on the invested funds.
How did these early state and local pension funds manage the assets they
held? Several state plans, including the Connecticut plan, restricted the
plans to holding only those assets that could be held by state-chartered
mutual savings banks. Typically, these banks could hold federal, state, or
local debt. In most states, they could usually hold debt issued by private corporations and occasionally private equities. In the Wrst half of the twentieth
century, there were 19 states that chartered mutual savings banks. They were
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overwhelmingly in the northeast, midwest, and far west—the same regions
in which state and local pension plans were most prevalent (Hickman
1958). However, in most cases the corporate securities were limited to
those on a so-called “legal list,” which was supposed to contain only the
safest corporate investments. Admission to the legal list was based on a
compilation of corporate assets, earnings, dividends, prior default records,
and so forth. The objective was to provide a list that consisted of the bluest
of blue chip corporate securities. In the Wrst decades of the twentieth century, these lists were dominated by railroad and public utility issues (Hickman 1958). States such as Massachusetts that did not restrict investments to
those held by mutual savings banks nonetheless placed similar limits on
state pension funds. Massachusetts limited investments to those that could
be made in state-established “sinking funds.” Ohio explicitly limited its
pension funds to U.S. debt, Ohio state debt, and the debt of any “county,
village, city, or school district of the state of Ohio” (Studenski 1920).
Collectively, the objective of these restrictions was to minimize risk at the
expense of returns.
Of course, minimizing risk is not necessarily the sole investment strategy.
Almost all of the states and cities that maintained pension funds invested in
their own or other local securities. Although state and local bonds were relatively secure investments, there were two potential problems with a political unit investing heavily in its own debt. The Wrst problem is that a moral
hazard existed in the use of these bonds. For example, a city might force its
employees to contribute a certain proportion of their earnings to their pension funds. If the city then purchased debt at par from itself for the pension
fund when that debt might for various reasons not circulate at par on the
open market, then the city could be tempted to go to the pension fund
rather than the market for funds.5 This process would tend to insulate the
city from the discipline of the bond market, which would in turn tend to
cause the city to overinvest in activities Wnanced in this way. In short, the
pension fund, and hence the workers, are essentially forced to subsidize
other city operations—for example, sewer or road construction. The second and potentially more troublesome problem was the potential that the
pension fund would receive a below market return for the risk inherent in
the bonds. Since state and local bonds are exempt from federal income tax,
ceteris paribus, they trade at a premium relative to other issues. Thus, municipalities and states that invest in their own securities sacriWce income without a compensating reduction in risk. Obviously, this premium is going to
depend on the federal tax rate on interest income and the number of taxpayers subject to the tax.
Municipal bond income is exempt from federal taxes. In most cases,
municipal bond income is also tax-exempt at the state level for municipalities within that state. The federal tax exemption has been in place since the
advent of the federal income tax in 1913, but the rate of taxation on interest
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income and capital gains, even for relatively high income earners, was quite
low by any standard prior to the early 1940s. Since World War II, municipal
yields have been lower than yields for industrial bonds, public utility bonds,
and railroad/transportation bonds. In large part, this outcome is due to the
tax exemption, but it also reXects a risk differential. Prior to the dramatic
increase in personal income tax rates in 1942, any yield differential between
the source of the issuer of a bond was due almost entirely to the risk of the
borrower. Of course, the risk differential is itself a function of the public
Wnance issues we outlined earlier in this chapter. In particular, it ultimately
derived from the coercive powers of the state.
For the purposes of this discussion, the key period was from 1900
through 1933. For this period, the median yields in annual percentage
terms for the highest to lowest risk for the four groups were 4.92 percent for
industrial bonds, 4.83 percent for utilities, 4.42 percent for rails, and 4.05
percent for municipals. The overall median yield for the 60-bond average
was 4.55 percent.6 The ratios of municipal yields to those of the bonds from
the other sectors were
Industrials
Public utilities
Railroads
All

0.8240
0.8385
0.9163
0.8901

One should be careful about focusing too closely on the average relative
risk. Municipal bond risk changed over time, as did the risk of bonds of
other sectors. For example, the risk of municipal bonds increased sharply
at the beginning of the Great Depression. Indeed, the ratio of municipal
yields to those of the bonds from the other sectors exceeded unity in 1931.
This period was one in which the delinquency rate on property taxes in the
200 largest cities increased from 5 percent in 1928 to over 25 percent in
1933. The rate had fallen back to less than 5 percent by the end of World
War II (Hempel 1971).
Other factors involved in the risk of municipals was (and largely still is)
the size of the debt relative to the tax base, sinking fund considerations,
refunding experience, sound debt management processes, and so forth
(Hillhouse 1936). Table 10.7 contains the annual Wgures for yield ratios
summarized above. Although these data suggest that the tax-free status of
municipal bonds played a smaller role in their prices and yields in the past,
they also suggest that even in the 1920s there was an effect from these factors. Indeed while only a small proportion of the labor force (roughly 6 percent) paid income tax in the late 1920s, and while the highest marginal rate
was one percent, it was exactly these taxpayers who typically held municipal
bonds (Lent 1955).
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Obviously, in the absence of the effect of tax treatment for municipal
bonds, if the risk of holding municipal bonds was less than that associated
with holding corporate bonds, a yield differential might make sense to a
prudent investor. It might make sense to a state or municipal employee
retirement fund. In such situations, the question becomes one of the returnrisk tradeoff. However, beginning with the period of World War II, with a
distinct tax advantage to individuals investing in municipal bonds, the market price of municipals was driven up by a factor of one minus the marginal
tax rate. With the lower yields resulting from the lower effective tax rates
Table 10.7. Annual December Bond Yields of Municipals, Industrials, Railroads,
and Utilities, and the Ratio of the Sector Yields to Municipal Yields,
1900–1929
Bond yield by sector

Ratio of municipal to sector yield

Year

Muni.

Ind.

RR.

Util.

Ind.

RR.

Util.

1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929

3.08
3.17
3.25
3.48
3.38
3.44
3.67
4.17
3.79
3.85
4.01
4.00
4.09
4.23
4.15
4.02
3.84
4.51
4.36
4.47
5.10
4.52
4.15
4.35
4.12
4.13
4.07
3.90
4.15
4.22

4.83
4.79
4.75
5.05
4.69
4.48
4.65
5.43
4.76
4.75
4.81
4.81
4.87
5.10
5.03
4.87
4.88
5.49
5.35
5.55
6.23
5.55
5.16
5.26
5.13
5.00
4.87
4.79
4.98
5.03

3.97
3.87
3.93
4.10
3.92
3.91
4.03
4.46
4.03
4.11
4.17
4.17
4.25
4.54
4.71
4.48
4.42
5.28
4.98
5.57
5.79
5.09
4.88
4.94
4.74
4.63
4.43
4.17
4.47
4.80

4.51
4.50
4.50
4.68
4.47
4.42
4.67
5.26
4.79
4.71
4.81
4.78
4.83
5.02
4.96
4.84
4.78
5.48
5.63
6.33
6.98
5.99
5.27
5.49
5.14
5.01
4.84
4.72
4.77
4.80

.6377
.6618
.6842
.6891
.7207
.7679
.7892
.7680
.7962
.8105
.8337
.8316
.8398
.8294
.8250
.8255
.7869
.8215
.8150
.8054
.8186
.8144
.8043
.8270
.8031
.8260
.8357
.8142
.8333
.8390

.7758
.8191
.8270
.8488
.8622
.8798
.9107
.9350
.9404
.9367
.9616
.9592
.9624
.9317
.8811
.8973
.8688
.8542
.8755
.8025
.8808
.8880
.8504
.8806
.8692
.8920
.9187
.9353
.9284
.8792

.6829
.7044
.7222
.7436
.7562
.7783
.7859
.7928
.7912
.8174
.8337
.8368
.8468
.8426
.8367
.8306
.8033
.8230
.7744
.7062
.7307
.7546
.7875
.7923
.8016
.8244
.8409
.8263
.8700
.8792

Source: Yields from Standard Statistics Company (1931), using the December average yield
for each year for each sector from monthly data. The ratios were calculated by the authors.
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on the income of individuals holding municipal bonds, it makes little sense
for a tax-exempt retirement fund to hold state and local bonds, ceteris
paribus of course.
The individual income tax in the United States had its origin as a temporary tax during the Civil War, 1862–71. An income tax was reinstated
in 1894, but was declared unconstitutional in 1895 by the Supreme Court.
The income tax enacted in 1913, following a Constitutional amendment,
has been in effect in one form or another to the present day. This income
tax is “applied to wages, salaries, interest, dividends, rents, entrepreneurial
income, and capital gains. It allowed deductions for personal interest, federal excise taxes, and all state taxes, as well as for business expenses. It
exempted federal, state, and local government bond interest” (Pechman 1987).
Many of these initial exemptions were eliminated—speciWcally that of interest on federal bonds was discontinued in 1941—but the exemption for
state and local bond interest was maintained. Initially, the rates of the federal income tax were quite low. Pechman (1987) provides the tax rates for
the Wrst (lowest) and the top (highest) tax brackets from 1913. During
1913–15, the Wrst bracket taxes were one percent of taxable income up to
$20,000, and for the top bracket the rate was 7 percent of taxable income
over $500,000. These rates went up somewhat during World War I, but
eased back down after 1923.
In an attempt to measure returns on common stocks and federal bonds
from 1925, Fisher and Lorie (1977) calculated effective marginal tax rates
on investment income for individuals with “lower tax rates” and for those
facing “higher tax rates.” These rates were broken down into the categories
of stock dividends, capital gains, and bond interest. A version of those rates
is shown in Table 10.8. For the lower-rate taxpayer, the tax on interest was
zero from 1926 through 1939, one percent in 1940, then increasing to 7
percent in 1941 and to 13 percent in 1942. For the higher-rate taxpayer, the
marginal rates on interest income was one percent in 1926–30, decreasing
to zero in 1931, and then back up to one percent in 1932–34. In 1935 this
higher-rate taxpayer moved into a 6 percent marginal rate bracket, then 7
or 8 percent through 1939, then into higher brackets. By the end of World
War II, the marginal rates were up to 18 percent for the lower-rate taxpayer,
and over 60 percent for the higher-rate taxpayer. Therefore, it seems that
the tax exemption of state and local bond income was quite small prior to
1940 or so, but it has been a major factor affecting yields of tax-exempt
bonds relative to their taxable counterpart of federal and corporate bonds.
Table 10.8 shows the “low” and “high” rate taxpayer marginal rates by
income source through 1976, and in the far right-hand column of the table
is the ratio of municipal yields to corporate yields. The relative tax rates by
income source, with the tax-exemption for state and municipal interest
income, interacts with the capital gains marginal rates and dividend rates
in competition for investor’s choices for their portfolios. Also, the relative
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Table 10.8. Marginal Tax Brackets for a Low-Rate Taxpayer and for a High-Rate
Taxpayer, by Income Sources, with the Ratio of the Yield on Municipal
Bonds to the Yield on Corporate Bonds, 1925–1979 (percent)
Low Bracket
Year

Dividend

1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
4.0
10.0
13.0
22.0
25.0
25.0
24.7
24.7
17.4
17.4
18.0
20.3
22.1
22.1
19.8
15.8
15.8
15.8
15.8
15.8
18.0
18.0
22.0
22.0
21.5
22.0
22.0
22.0
26.9
27.5
25.6
25.0
28.0
28.0
28.0
32.0
32.0
—
—
—

Cap.
Gain
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.0
5.0
6.5
11.0
12.5
12.5
12.4
12.4
8.7
8.7
9.0
10.1
11.1
11.1
9.9
9.9
9.9
9.9
9.9
9.9
11.0
11.0
13.0
13.0
11.8
11.0
11.0
11.0
13.4
13.8
12.8
12.5
14.0
14.0
14.0
16.0
16.0
—
—
—

High Bracket
Interest
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.0
7.0
13.0
22.0
25.0
25.0
14.7
14.7
17.4
17.4
18.0
20.3
22.1
22.1
19.8
19.8
19.8
19.8
19.8
19.8
22.0
26.0
26.0
26.0
23.5
22.0
22.0
22.0
26.9
27.5
25.6
25.0
28.0
28.0
28.0
32.0
32.0
—
—
—

Dividend
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
6.0
11.0
11.0
10.0
10.0
15.4
36.0
42.0
58.0
62.0
62.0
58.9
58.9
41.4
41.4
42.8
51.0
56.0
59.0
53.0
49.0
52.0
52.0
52.0
55.0
55.0
55.0
55.0
58.0
54.0
53.0
55.0
55.0
59.1
63.8
59.5
60.0
59.6
61.6
61.6
61.6
63.6
—
—
—

Cap.
Gain

Interest

6.0
6.0
6.0
6.0
6.0
6.0
5.0
9.0
9.0
9.0
8.0
6.6
6.6
5.0
5.0
7.7
15.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
20.7
20.7
21.4
25.0
26.0
26.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
26.9
27.5
25.6
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
—
—
—

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
6.0
8.0
8.0
7.0
7.0
12.4
33.0
42.0
58.0
62.0
62.0
58.9
58.9
41.4
41.4
42.8
51.0
56.0
59.0
53.0
53.0
56.0
56.0
56.0
59.0
59.0
59.0
59.0
62.0
56.0
53.0
55.0
55.0
59.1
63.8
59.5
60.0
59.6
61.6
61.6
61.6
63.6
—
—
—

Ratio
.8320
.8611
.8718
.8956
.9000
.8954
.8720
.9379
1.0559
.9923
.9433
.9649
.9478
.8995
.9003
.8819
.8562
.8216
.7467
.6789
.6368
.6338
.7623
.8564
.8301
.7909
.7113
.7165
.8468
.8162
.8128
.8194
.8469
.8357
.8099
.7964
.7921
.8252
.7416
.7256
.7240
.7431
.7153
.7195
.8180
.7822
.7328
.7298
.7064
.7215
.7956
.7895
.7080
.6917
.6739

Source: The marginal tax rates are from Fisher and Lorie (1977), and the ratio of municipal yields to corporate yields are from various sources explained in the text.

10Chap10.qxd

2/27/03

210

9:35 AM

Page 210

Chapter 10

risk factors between municipal and corporate debt instruments is not factored into the calculated levels of the yield ratios. The changes in the effective tax rates over time that are shown in the table would be factors in
changing the relative yields of state and municipal bonds to corporate
bonds. Another major factor in the yield differentials would be the changing relative risks of the two classes of bonds.
There have been several episodes of debt repudiation and/or default in
American history, and the major ones tended to impact the public sector
pension funds. In the 1840s, there were a very large number of defaults and
repudiations—as we saw in the history of the U.S. navy pension fund. The
Florida Territory and Mississippi repudiated completely. Partial repudiation occurred by Arkansas, Louisiana, and Michigan. Illinois, Indiana,
Maryland, and Pennsylvania defaulted temporarily, with resumption at a
later date (English 1996; Sylla, Legler, and Wallis 1987). The primary cause
of the problems during this period had to do with building canals or otherwise expanding and improving the transportation networks. The actual
public Wnance machinations that led to default were often quite arcane
(Wallis 2001), and public infrastructure per se was not always the culprit.
Another cause was the problem of states issuing bonds to guarantee bonds
of commercial banks. The 1840s period was basically a troublesome one for
state government Wnance, but the problems were not generally reXected in
municipal indebtedness. However, the Wrst recorded municipal default, of
Mobile, Alabama in 1839, did occur during this era (Hempel 1971).
The history of state and local public Wnance shows an increase up to
about 10 defaults per year during the Civil War, and then an increase
beyond 25 defaults per annum in the late 1870s (Hempel 1971).
The defaults of the 1870s were in many cases directly related to the end
of Reconstruction (Woodward 1951). Between 1868 and 1874 the carpetbagger regimes in the former Confederate states had increased overall state
debt from $174 million to $275 million. Given the economic damage
wrought by the Civil War, the taxes levied to support this debt proved burdensome. Or at least that’s one view! Another view is that the debt was
incurred to support “pet” projects, largely railroads, of the Republicans and
was paid for with local, that is, Democratic, tax dollars. In any case, once
the Democrats gained control of the southern state legislatures, they began
repudiating the carpetbagger debt. Collectively, the southern states defaulted on $150 million of Reconstruction bonds.
In the mid-1890s the number of defaults peaked up to about 60 per year,
and continued at a relatively high level into the early 1900s. Causes included
the panic of 1893, municipal indebtedness associated with real estate speculation, and failed irrigation projects in the west. Hempel’s chart also shows
a buildup of municipal defaults during the late 1920s, but these were mainly
located in Washington, Arkansas, and Florida and were due to the failure of
various special assessment bonds, as well as the Florida real estate collapse.
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The size of a political unit’s debt and the rate of increase in the level are
relevant factors in considerations of risk. Hillhouse (1936) provides some
examples of the growth of municipal debt from 1902 to 1932, with the comment that “Every ten years brought practically a doubling in debt” (see
Table 10.9). The level of municipal debt, in millions of dollars, was $1,603
in 1902, $3,476 in 1912, $7,754 in 1922, and $15,216 in 1932. Hillhouse
presents a table showing the increase in state and in municipal debt from
1840 to 1932, by approximate decade intervals, by total and by per capita
levels. Because the annual data shed light on the vagaries of municipal
bond risk, the summary data in the table correspond with the time period
covered in this volume (Hillhouse 1936).
It is evident from the values in the table that there was tremendous
growth in municipal debt relative to state debt over the period in question.
The increases in the 1930s, in both state and local debt, is rather phenomenal, and seems to have come at an unfortunate time, when various state
and local governments were ill equipped to handle the burden. Property
taxes were the primary source of revenue for local governments. At the
onset of the Great Depression, with unemployment rising dramatically and
agricultural prices falling, individuals simply could not afford to pay their
taxes, and the value of property fell sharply. According to Dun & Bradstreet
the tax delinquency in 151 large cities and their average (median) delinquency rates were 10 percent in 1930, 14 percent in 1931, 20 percent in
1932, 26 percent in 1933, and 23 percent in 1934. As a contemporary
observer commented: “Thus the average municipality in 1933 was trying
to meet its obligations with a fourth of its expected revenue unpaid”
(Hillhouse 1936). This situation during the Depression is what led to the
dramatic change in the ratio of municipal yields to those on other bonds,
and resulted in a ratio that exceeded unity in 1933 (Table 10.8).
Table 10.9. Growth of State and Municipal Debt by Decades, 1840–1932, by
Total Level and Per Capita Amounts
Total (millions)

Per capita

Year

State

Local

State

Local

Combined

1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890
1902
1912
1922
1932

$174
190
257
353
275
211
239
346
936
2,374

$25
—
200
516
821
926
1,630
3,476
7,754
15,216

$10.25
8.19
8.17
9.15
5.48
3.37
3.03
3.57
8.64
19.17

$1.17
—
6.36
13.38
16.37
14.79
20.74
35.81
71.32
123.06

11.42
—
14.53
22.53
21.85
18.16
23.77
39.38
79.96
142.23

Source: Hillhouse (1936, 36).
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The levels of bond risk varied considerably during this period. An estimate of the percentage of bonds in default by sector for 1932 shows municipals at a rate of 1.8 percent. The rate for other sectors was foreign bonds
at 19.4 percent, railroads at 3.5 percent, utilities at 5.4 percent, and industrials at 7.2 percent (Hillhouse 1936). Although the absolute level of
default risk for municipal bonds was high, it was low relative to alternative
bonded debt during this period. This difference in absolute and relative
risk of debt between “state and local” and “corporate” debt, relative to the
marginal tax rates, presented portfolio managers with a very complex decision. At this time, with every asset at extremely high levels of risk, and
with expectations of returns and default in Xux, it still might have been a
rational decision for a retirement fund to invest in local municipal bonds,
even if there were no tax advantages.
Because of the income loss that results from states and municipalities
holding their own securities, government units that purchased tax-exempt
bonds for their pension funds have been accused of poor investment practices (Tilove 1976). Although on the surface this practice of a city purchasing its own debt seems a bit like a shell game, at another level it makes
perfect sense. One set of government accounts—the pension fund—was
currently in surplus, while another—the road construction fund, for example—was in deWcit. The city simply borrowed the money from one fund to
pay for the other. The resulting debt would be amortized through either a
speciWc tax, on property, for example, or the general coercive powers of the
state. Furthemore, it is not altogether clear that the net return the pension
fund received on those bonds was lower than other potential assets. It is
clear that the city or state that purchased its own debt sacriWced gross
income as a result of the tax-free premium placed on those securities.
However, by purchasing its own debt a political unit avoided the transaction costs associated with both selling its own debt in the market and purchasing other assets for the pension fund. Hence whether or not these
investments were in fact unwise remains an open question. If one assumes
that much of the difference in the bond yield ratios before 1930 was driven
by differences in risk and if one keeps in mind that brokerage charges were
several percent of the value of an issue, the back-of-the-envelope calculation would suggest that, historically, these investments were safe and relatively high-yielding.
We have calculated the shares of pension assets held in various types of
investments between 1915 and 1930. It should be noted that the absence of
records and the lack of accounting standards make interpreting the status
of these funds quite difWcult in some cases. Also, in some cases the difference between the current liabilities of the fund and its assets was so small
that the funds simply maintained what essentially amounted to a perpetual
cash position of 100 percent, with, one assumes, a local Wnancial institution.
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This was particularly true of small and medium-sized city funds. In the case
of most of the larger cities, however, the funds accumulated a substantial
amount of money and invested it by purchasing Wnancial assets. This was
true from early on in many cases. For example, an annual report of the
Police Fund of the City of Cleveland for 1910 showed that the fund had an
outlay for the year of $68,487, while it maintained $213,535 in assets, of
which $188,000 was “safely invested” with the remainder in cash (Squier
1912). While it is impossible to determine exactly what assets were held by
the Cleveland pension fund in 1910, by 1915 roughly one-third of these
assets were in fact held in Cleveland municipal bonds. While the early
Cleveland funds might have been safely invested that was not always the
case with other cities. As with the navy pension fund, the accumulation of
funds often creates a moral hazard for trustees. In the case of Chicago
police pension fund, an early scholar of these issues had to report that: “It
is to be regretted that there are no complete statistical records showing the
operation of this fund in the city of Chicago” (Squier 1912). It is hard to
imagine that the records were simply misplaced by accident.
Table 10.10 contains the share of pension assets municipalities held in
their own debt between 1915 and 1930. There are at least four characteristics of these data that are important to our narrative. First, the data show
tremendous variation across cities and over time. For example, in 1915
Baltimore held 99 percent of its pension fund’s assets in its own debt, as did
New York City in 1930. In contrast, several other cities held none of their
own debt. Baltimore’s share fell to 30 percent by the end of the period while
Los Angeles’s Xuctuated between zero and 66 percent. Second, the unweighted mean declined over time. This suggests that, on average, cities
reduced the share of their pension assets held in their own debt. However,
the weighted mean increased. The reduction in the weighted mean resulted
from the general growth in public debt during the period and the availability of alternative investment opportunities. As the pension funds grew
and other investments became available, the opportunity cost of alternative
investments tended to increase. The growth of the weighted mean was
largely the result of two of the largest cities (New York and Detroit) substantially increasing the share of their assets composed of their own debt.
Third, over the period there was a general trend toward convergence
among the cities. This is shown by the decline in the coefWcient of variation
(the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean). A decline in the coefWcient suggests that the dispersion of own-debt held across cities was
declining over time. Finally, the chi-square test statistic suggests that one can
reject the hypothesis that the portfolio distribution between cash, a city’s
own debt, and other investments remained the same between 1915 and
1930. In other words, it is safe to say that cities shifted out of cash and their
own debt and into other investments in a statistically meaningful sense.
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Table 10.11 contains the same information for the states that offered
teacher or other pension plans in the 1920s. The data show that three of the
four conclusions drawn from the municipal data apply to the states as well.
There was tremendous dispersion; Pennsylvania held 100 percent of its pension funds in state debt in 1915, while three states—Connecticut, Montana,
and North Dakota—held none of their own debt. The unweighted mean fell
over time, and the coefWcient of variation fell as well, suggesting a reduction in the dispersion among the states as well as a reduction in the mean
holdings. Also, the chi-square test statistic suggests that one can reject the
hypothesis that the states had the same portfolio distributions in 1930 as
they did in 1915. What differs between Table 10.10 and 10.11 is the trend in
the weighted means. There was no large state driving the weighted mean the
way that New York and Detroit did for the cities. The same two factors driving these trends for the cities were most likely at work at the state level as
well. There were a more diverse set of investment opportunities and the
price premium associated with the state and local bonds’ tax-exempt status.
Table 10.10. Share of Pension Assets Held in a City’s Own Municipal Securities,
1915–30 (percent)
City

1915

1925

1930

Baltimore
Boston
Buffalo
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Detroit
Los Angeles
Milwaukee
Minneapolis
Newark
New Orleans
New York
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
St. Louis
San Francisco
Washington, D.C.

99.4
82.0
37.1
11.3
43.5
35.4
24.0
0.0
36.1
34.1
32.0
57.2
68.2
16.6
26.7
16.3
0.0
24.2

94.2
47.0
8.7
25.5
9.7
0.0
56.8
65.6
26.0
12.9
34.8
27.3
93.6
9.0
6.3
21.5
49.2
0.0

30.1
37.6
0.0
27.9
9.4
9.1
97.4
22.9
77.5
8.8
10.6
8.6
98.8
17.4
41.6
24.1
21.7
0.0

Median
Mean (unweighted)
Coefficient of
variation
Mean (weighted)

32.0
35.8

25.5
32.7

21.7
30.2

0.90
29.4

0.73
40.2

0.59
52.1

Chi-square test statistic

(1915–30)

32.2

Source: Authors’ calculations from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (various years).
Some fund data include assets from funds other than those held for pensions, such as library
funds.
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Summary
Four points can be used to summarize the early history of state and local
plans. First, after a long, slow start the number of local pension plans began
to accelerate in the early decades of the twentieth century. Second,
although in general state plans came somewhat later, given that schoolteachers were the largest group of state employees at the time, a substantial
proportion of state workers were covered by a plan in the 1920s. Third, the
date of establishment and characteristics of local pension plans were largely
driven by the relationship between the state legislatures and the cities they
created. Finally, the investments of the state and local pension plans were
inXuenced by the state legislation that created them. Often the cities were

Table 10.11. Share of Pension Assets Held in a State’s Own Public Securities,
1915–30 (percent)
State
Maine
Vermont
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Ohio
Indiana
Illinois
Michigan
Wisconsin
Minnesota
North Dakota
Maryland
Virginia
Montana
Nevada
California
Median
Mean (unweighted)
Coefficient of
variation
Mean (weighted)
Chi-square test statistic

1915

1925

1930

99.6
19.4
7.6
0.3
0.0
10.1
7.5
75.1
100.0
4.7
83.5
94.7
30.8
1.3
0.0
55.1
51.4
0.0
19.0
19.4

95.1
28.9
2.9
3.4
0.1
3.6
1.1
1.8
17.5
1.7
42.4
28.1
9.8
7.2
0.0
30.7
38.8
12.3
35.1
8.4

53.8
35.4
14.5
2.9
0.0
1.9
0.7
11.4
10.0
0.2
47.3
20.1
4.1
19.0
0.2
23.2
16.9
11.0
22.5
9.0

19.4
34.0

9.8
18.4

11.4
15.2

2.77
13.4
(1915–30)

2.46
9.3

1.54
10.0

9.6

Source: Authors’ calculations from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
(various years).
Note: Some fund data include assets from funds other than those held for pensions, such as
state hospital funds. In only one case have we adjusted these figures. Montana’s figures
exclude public lands held in trust for nonpension purposes.
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severely restricted, by law, in the investments they could make, and they
invested a relatively large amount in their own debt. This practice continued well into the twentieth century, and it was subsequently criticized by a
variety of scholars and Wnancial analysts. Despite these assessments, this
practice probably made good sense at the time not withstanding the moral
hazard and tax issues.
Despite their late start relative to that of European public sector pension
plans, the state and local governments had a jump on the U.S. government
when it came to offering a universal plan for its nonmilitary workers. Prior
to the inclusion of most other public sector workers, early municipal pension plans were largely offered to police ofWcers and WreWghters, just as
early federal plans were offered Wrst to uniformed military personnel and
then to civil servants. The higher risk of disability in these occupations
probably accounted for the early disability pension plans, while the speciWc
nature of their tasks accounted for the early retirement programs. More
generally, this history of the early nonmilitary, public sector pension plans
demonstrates the origins of many characterisitics common to modern public sector plans. For example, many public sector plans had replacement
rates in the neighborhood of 50 percent, which is similar to those offered
today. In addition, the early plans were mainly deWned beneWt plans that
required employee contributions. The contributions component is interesting because it contrasts with private sector deWned beneWt plans that
generally do not require a contribution from workers. The contribution
requirement was probably related to the public Wnance issues discussed
above. In particular, the need for an immediate cash Xow to fund near-term
pension liabilities was crucial.
Notes
1. The material on state and local public Wnance owes much to Bromage (1936)
and James (1921).
2. Many of these early municipal pension plans were described or otherwise
referred to in Squier (1912) and/or a series of articles in the Monthly Labor Review
in the 1920s.
3. For a discussion of the subsequent development of state pension plans, see
Steffen (2001).
4. The original document is Connecticut (Laws of 1917, Chapter 411). It is discussed at length in Studenski (1920).
5. Such transactions are similar to those conducted between the U.S. navy pension fund and the Second Bank of the United States. In that case, the U.S. Treasury
sold Second Bank stock to the fund at par, while the fund was selling at the market
price, which included a 15 to 20 percent premium.
6. These data are available from sources of the Standard Statistics Company,
which merged in 1940 with Poor’s to become Standard & Poor’s. These monthly
data exist for 15 selected bonds each of four sectors—an industrial sector, public
utilities, railroads, and municipal bonds. Also calculated was a composite yield,
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which was the arithmetic average of the 60 bonds. Essentially, this was a time period
of effective federal tax rates on income and capital gains of zero percent (Fisher and
Lorie 1977, and Appendix Table 1 below). As with the previous period, any yield differential during this period would be primarily a measure of risk differences. These
data are of high quality, and were maintained with very little change in deWnition
over long periods of time. The basic sources are the Standard Statistical Bulletin Base
Books (March 1930 and the update of April 1934). As time passed, the sectors
changed slightly, and recently less attention has been paid to bond yields and
returns by S&P than to stock returns. However, the monthly municipal yield series
has been maintained for over 100 years in essentially the same form. Since January
1929, the monthly average yields are based on the weekly quotes within month.

